By Wale Ogunbanjo
A closer look at how the 2026 State Performance Index defines and measures “momentum”
Phillips Consulting’s 2026 State Performance Index (pSPI) deserves credit for drawing attention to subnational governance.
It combines citizen satisfaction, fiscal self-reliance, debt per capita, IGR growth and transparency into a single score intended to show which states are progressing.
The shift from an absolute league table to a Momentum Index is useful in concept because governments should be assessed not only by what they inherited, but also by the distance they have travelled.
A close reading of the methodology, however, reveals six important weaknesses.
1. The index does not predominantly measure momentum
Issue: Momentum ordinarily describes movement or change over time. Yet only IGR growth, weighted at 15%, is unmistakably a change variable. Citizen satisfaction, fiscal self-reliance, debt per capita and transparency mostly describe current position or status.
Example: Abia’s Momentum score is +0.67, but +0.59 of that score comes from its current citizen-satisfaction level. That establishes that Abia is rated favourably relative to other states; it does not, by itself, measure how much satisfaction improved. Likewise, the report says that zero means movement at the national pace, although a zero z-score for current satisfaction or debt merely means approximately average current position. See the national report, pp. 10, 14 and 61.
Why it matters: A state can rank highly because it inherited a favourable fiscal or institutional position, while a state improving rapidly from a low base may still appear weak. The labels “rising” and “slipping” therefore communicate more movement than the formula actually measures. India’s Aspirational Districts Programme, cited by the report, is not a complete validation because its delta rankings are based on repeated incremental changes across indicators.
2. The indicators, weights and treatment of outliers are insufficiently justified
Issue: The report assigns 30% to citizen satisfaction, 25% to fiscal self-reliance, 20% to debt, 15% to IGR growth and 10% to transparency, but does not adequately explain why these particular weights were chosen. It also does not publish sensitivity tests showing whether the rankings remain stable under reasonable alternatives.
Example: Enugu’s reported 381% one-year IGR growth makes a large contribution to its leading score of +1.15. Such an exceptional increase should be tested for a low-base effect, arrears, reclassification, exceptional receipts and accounting changes before it is treated as durable momentum. See pp. 14–15 and 61.
Why it matters: A ranking may change materially when one unusually large observation or a modest change in weights affects the composite score. The report should show results under equal weights, alternative defensible weights and appropriate treatment of extreme values.
3. Some indicators are incomplete or misleadingly labelled
Issue: Debt per capita is labelled “debt sustainability,” although sustainability depends on repayment capacity, not merely the amount of debt divided by population. Similarly, IGR divided by FAAC is useful but incomplete as a measure of fiscal self-reliance.
Example: Lagos is penalised for debt of about ₦173,000 per person while Jigawa is rewarded for very low debt. But the measure does not compare debt service with recurring revenue, interest costs, maturity, currency exposure or the returns from financed assets. Also, an IGR/FAAC ratio can fall when FAAC rises even if a state’s IGR improves. See pp. 29–30 and 61.
Why it matters: The debt indicator should be called “debt burden per capita—reverse-scored” unless broader repayment-capacity measures are added. Fiscal self-reliance should also include real IGR per capita, multi-year IGR growth and recurring revenue relative to expenditure.
4. The survey methodology and uncertainty are not sufficiently disclosed
Issue: The report gives respondent totals but provides insufficient detail on respondent selection, urban-rural representation, demographic weighting, survey mode, non-response and design effects. It publishes precise scores without state-level confidence intervals.
Example: Samples range from 12,256 respondents in Lagos and 5,968 in the FCT to only 64 in Kebbi and 193 each in Enugu and Taraba. Despite these sharply different levels of precision, their scores are placed in the same comparative tables. The report marks some results as directional but does not fully quantify the uncertainty. See pp. 22–23 and 62.
Why it matters: A large sample is not necessarily representative, and a small sample can produce an unstable estimate. Because national scores are calculated across valid respondents, high-sample jurisdictions may also exert disproportionate influence unless appropriate weighting is demonstrated.
5. The periods, baselines and causal claims are not properly aligned
Issue: The index combines information from different periods: FY2024 audited accounts, IGR growth from 2023 to 2024, allocations through 2025 and citizen perceptions collected in 2026. This makes direct attribution difficult.
Example: The headline “Money is up. Lives are not yet” compares a 118% nominal rise in federal allocations between 2022 and 2025 with a 2026 national satisfaction score of 2.90. Without a comparable 2022 satisfaction baseline, that comparison cannot establish that satisfaction failed to improve. The allocation increase is also not presented in real per-capita terms. See pp. 7, 18–19 and 61.
Why it matters: The report sometimes moves too quickly from association to causation—for example, attributing state outcomes to particular governance choices when insecurity, inflation, inherited institutions and federal projects may also contribute. The relevant fiscal and perception periods should be aligned, and causal explanations clearly identified as interpretations unless independently established.
6. Internal inconsistencies and limited reproducibility weaken confidence
Issue: Important figures and descriptions are not always consistent across the report, while the underlying calculation workbook, survey weights and complete dataset are not published in a form that permits independent replication.
Example: The report refers to “thirty states” being scored, although the leaderboard contains 33. Abia is reported at +0.60 in the executive summary but +0.67 in the main table and appendix. Jigawa’s debt per capita appears as ₦5,057 on p. 29 and ₦4,791 on p. 61. The methodology also refers to five states without published accounts, while the coverage note identifies only FCT and Rivers as missing accounts and Yobe and Zamfara as excluded for inadequate survey responses. See pp. 7, 10, 14, 29 and 61–62.
Why it matters: Minor errors do not automatically invalidate an index, but inconsistencies in inputs, eligibility and reported results make verification harder. Publishing a machine-readable dataset, exact formula, state-level component scores, survey weights and revision log would materially strengthen credibility.
A better way forward
The pSPI could retain its present formula but rename it a Relative State Performance and Fiscal Capacity Index. States would then be described as above or below the comparison-group average rather than as rising or slipping.
The stronger solution is to publish two complementary measures: a Current Performance Index showing where each state stands, and a Momentum Index showing how much each state has improved or deteriorated over a defined period.
A genuine momentum measure could use changes in citizen satisfaction under a consistent survey design; multi-year real IGR per capita; changes in debt-service burden; and changes in comparable health, education, water, road and security outcomes.
Conclusion
The pSPI is a worthwhile accountability initiative. Its focus on state-level delivery, citizen experience and audited information deserves support.
Its central methodological claim is nevertheless overstated. In the present construction, only 15% of the index unmistakably measures change over time, while most of the score reflects current position or compliance status.
The 2026 pSPI is therefore more convincingly a relative composite-performance index than a Momentum Index. Separating present performance from change in performance would make it more rigorous, transparent and useful.