By Oyewole O. Sarumi
We are presently in a world that is quietly rewriting Its rules. “If you know, you know” as the slang says in Nigeria.
There is this erstwhile assumption that every age believes it understands power, until the architecture of power changes, and the mat is removed from under your feet.
This is the fact: For nearly three decades after the Cold War, the global order appeared stable. Markets expanded, liberal democracy spread rhetorically if not always substantively, and globalization promised a shared prosperity built on interconnected supply chains and financial integration. Davos became the symbolic parliament of globalization, not a governing body, yet influential enough that its conversations often previewed the policies of tomorrow across nations.
When we decode the language emerging from the recent World Economic Forum dialogues, and combined with statements from leaders such as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Emmanuel Macron of France and German political leadership in Berlin, signals a shift that is deeper than policy disagreements. It is a civilizational re-evaluation of who truly governs: elected leaders, corporate capital, technological networks, or centralized state authority.
The geopolitical contest today is no longer merely about territory or military alliances. It is about the relationship between wealth and sovereignty, whether capital commands the state, negotiates with it, or remains subordinate to it.
Across the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, Canada, and Africa, different models of power organization are emerging. They are not temporary deviations. They are competing political philosophies about the legitimacy of authority in the 21st century. The world is not just becoming multipolar.
It is becoming multi-systemic.
In this piece, I will try to articulate each model of power that are emerging, and postulate wht3 the new world orders will be, how they will interact, relate, influence and its coping mechanisms over the coming decades.
The Western Corporate-State Partnership: Democracy and Influence
In North America and much of Western Europe, political legitimacy rests on elections. We know that elections require funding, and funding creates influence. Over decades, a sophisticated ecosystem has evolved: campaign financing, lobbying, think tanks, regulatory advisory boards, and post-public-office corporate careers.
This is not hidden corruption; it is institutionalized interaction between private capital and public authority.
In the United States, political campaigns are extraordinarily expensive. Federal election spending crossed tens of billions of dollars in recent cycles. Corporate political action committees, large donors, and advocacy organizations legally shape policy agendas. After public service, policymakers often join corporate boards or advisory firms, bringing networks and knowledge with them. The system does not see this as subversion it interprets it as pluralism.
From the Western perspective, influence competition is preferable to centralized control because multiple interests balance each other. Industry, labour, civil society, and government interact continuously. Power becomes distributed rather than monopolized.
However, critics argue this diffusion creates a different concentration: not of state authority, but of economic influence.
A technology executive may never run for office, yet s/he can shape taxation rules, digital privacy standards, trade regulations, or environmental compliance frameworks through institutional channels.
The consequence is subtle but profound: the state remains sovereign, but policymaking becomes negotiated amongst the haves! .
This model defines much of the Western alliance system, including Canada and the European Union, though the degree varies by country.
Europe’s Strategic Awakening: Autonomy After Dependence
For decades, the European project prioritized economic integration over geopolitical independence. Security relied heavily on transatlantic cooperation, while industry benefited from global supply chains and relatively inexpensive energy imports. However, recent crises changed that calculus.
The war in Ukraine, supply disruptions, semiconductor competition, and technological decoupling have forced Europe to reconsider its structural dependencies. Macron’s repeated calls for “strategic autonomy” reflect not anti-American sentiment but recognition that Europe must act as a geopolitical actor rather than merely an economic bloc.
Germany’s evolving rhetoric also signals a transition from post-Cold War pacifist economic pragmatism toward industrial sovereignty. Reindustrialization, defense spending increases, and technology protection policies show Europe repositioning itself between American market capitalism and Chinese state capitalism.
My personal view is that Europe now faces a dilemma: It wants markets open, but not vulnerable.
It wants partnership, but not dependence. It wants democracy preserved, but industry protected.
For me, this creates a hybrid model: still liberal, but increasingly strategic, and if they can keep working on it, the outcome will be spectacularly relieving for them.
Russia’s Centralized Sovereignty Model
Russia represents a radically different trajectory.”In the 1990s, privatization transferred enormous industrial and resource wealth into private hands at unprecedented speed. We observed many business magnates became political actors capable of influencing national direction.
The early 2000s marked a reversal of this system. The Kremlin reasserted authority over strategic sectors, particularly energy, defense, and media, establishing a doctrine: economic elites may prosper, but they cannot compete with the state.
So, what operates under Vladimir Putin is that sovereignty became indivisible. Wealth could exist privately, yet political power remained centralized with the State.
The model is not purely ideological; it is historical. Russian political philosophy has long prioritized state continuity over pluralistic negotiation, shaped by geography, invasion history, and resource distribution across vast territory.
In geopolitical terms, Russia argues stability requires a strong state capable of resisting both foreign interference and domestic fragmentation. Critics describe authoritarianism; supporters describe preservation of national coherence. Without much arguments on who’s right or wrong, and regardless of interpretation, the result is clear: economic elites operate under political boundaries defined by the state, not vice versa.
China’s Pre-Emptive Control of Capital
China took an even more preventative path.
The Chinese system rather than allow independent economic power centers to emerge and then restrain them, the system integrated private enterprise into a political framework from the beginning. Corporate success is encouraged, yet strategically aligned with national priorities.
We have noticed that under Xi Jinping, regulatory actions against large technology firms signaled a principle: scale must not equal autonomy from state objectives.
Chinese governance sees economic growth as a tool of national rejuvenation rather than an independent arena of influence. Companies contribute to technological development, infrastructure expansion, and global economic reach through initiatives like the Belt and Road.
The philosophical difference from Western capitalism lies in ownership of direction.
Markets allocate resources, but the state allocates purpose.
This produces extraordinary mobilization capacity, visible in infrastructure expansion, manufacturing dominance, and coordinated industrial policy. Although from Western allies, it also raises debates about innovation freedom and civil liberties, but they seem not to care because it’s working for them. Why? China’s model prioritizes long-term civilizational strategy over short-term market negotiation.
India: Democratic Scale Meets Strategic Statecraft
India presents perhaps the most complex hybrid system. It maintains electoral democracy on an immense scale while increasingly adopting industrial strategy characteristic of developmental states. The government supports domestic manufacturing, digital identity infrastructure, and technological sovereignty.
India, instead of rejecting globalization, she selectively integrates into it cooperating with Western economies while maintaining independent relations with Russia and expanding economic ties across Asia and Africa.
This multi-alignment approach reflects a civilizational confidence: India does not see itself as joining blocs but balancing them.
Its model suggests a future where democratic legitimacy coexists with state-guided economic direction, a middle path between laissez-faire and centralized control.
Canada: The Rise of the Middle-Power Doctrine
Canada is no longer presenting itself merely as a dependable extension of North American strategy. In his Davos address, Prime Minister Mark Carney openly acknowledged that the post-Cold War international system has fractured and that countries like Canada must adapt to a harsher geopolitical environment rather than wait for stability to return. He argued that the era of comfortable assumptions about a predictable rules-based order has ended and that middle-sized states must cooperate among themselves to avoid being dominated by larger powers.
Rather than defining prosperity primarily through integration with the United States, Ottawa is pursuing diversified alignment. Carney’s framework emphasizes “variable geometry”, building different coalitions depending on the issue, and reducing structural dependence on any single major power. This includes expanding trade partnerships beyond North America, strengthening ties with Europe and Asia, and coordinating with other middle powers to protect sovereignty and economic resilience.
The logic is strategic rather than ideological. Canada remains committed to Western values and alliances, yet it is positioning itself to operate even when great-power rivalry disrupts traditional partnerships. The speech explicitly warned that countries absent from decision-making arrangements risk becoming objects of decisions made by stronger states.
In practical terms, this means Canada is transitioning from continental dependency to networked diplomacy. Trade diversification, critical-mineral diplomacy, and independent defense industrial capacity all serve the same purpose: ensuring national autonomy in a world where economic interdependence can be used as leverage.
Canada therefore illustrates a broader transformation in global politics. Some states are not choosing between blocs, they are building overlapping partnerships to preserve room for maneuver. The country’s emerging doctrine is that sovereignty in the 21st century is maintained not by isolation, and not by single-alliance loyalty, but by flexible coalitions among nations of comparable scale facing the pressures of great-power competition.
In this sense, Canada is redefining what it means to be a middle power: not a follower in a hierarchy, but a coordinator within a networked order.
Africa’s Emerging Position: From Arena to Actor
For decades, Africa was treated primarily as a geopolitical theater a location where others competed. That assumption is eroding.
African states now engage multiple partners simultaneously: Chinese infrastructure finance, American security cooperation, European regulatory trade frameworks, Indian pharmaceutical production, and Gulf investment capital.
Africa, rather than choosing sides, many of their governments pursue diversification.
The African Continental Free Trade Area seeks internal economic integration, while digital finance innovations in countries like Kenya and Nigeria demonstrate endogenous technological growth.
Africa’s future influence will depend on whether it exports raw materials or negotiates value-added participation in global supply chains, especially in energy transition minerals like cobalt and lithium.
The continent is gradually shifting from object to participant in global strategy. I still firmly believe and well persuaded that until African leaders yield to the 1963/1964 calls of the former President of Ghana, Kwame Nkurumah, and Julius Nwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania that Africa must unite by becoming one unified State and Market, she would be continuously exploited by the colonialist through a neo-colonialism and divide and rule tactics. From my own perspective, they were damned right with the picture of Africa today as she has become the exporters of raw materials and importers of the finished products and the consequences of massive youth population that are not gainfully employed for lack industrialisation.
The Davos Shift: From Globalization to Resilience
The conversations in Davos increasingly revolve around resilience rather than efficiency.
For decades, globalization pursued lowest cost production regardless of geography. Now, states emphasize redundancy, national capacity, and technological sovereignty.
Supply chains are shortening. Strategic industries are being reshored or friend-shored. Economic integration continues, but unconditional interdependence is ending.
This marks the transition from globalization to geo-economics. Economic decisions are no longer purely commercial. They are national security considerations.
Competing Philosophies of Power
The global system now contains four broad governance philosophies:
- Western plural capitalism, power negotiated among state, market, and civil society.
- Russian sovereign statism, state authority defines limits of private influence.
- Chinese civilizational state capitalism, markets operate within national strategic design.
- Emerging hybrid systems, democratic legitimacy combined with industrial policy.
Let us take cognizance of this fact: None is universally accepted; all are expanding influence through trade, diplomacy, technology, and narrative.
The struggle is not only economic or military.
It is conceptual.”What should be sovereign: voters, markets, or national strategy? Your guess is as good as mine
Technology: The New Sovereignty Battlefield
In the 21st century, territory no longer defines strategic power as decisively as control over digital systems. Artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, operating software, and data governance have become instruments of sovereignty comparable to energy security or military capability. The emerging geopolitical divide is therefore increasingly technological rather than geographical in reality.
A cursory look across the Atlantic world, the European Union has begun to openly challenge the dominance of American technology corporations, not simply on commercial grounds, but on constitutional ones. European policymakers now frame digital infrastructure as part of national independence. This marks a decisive shift: technology is no longer treated as a neutral marketplace but as a strategic domain requiring political protection.
In this regard, regulatory enforcement has become the first battlefield. Under the Digital Markets Act, the European Commission fined Apple Inc. €500 million and Meta Platforms €200 million for violating competition and data-choice obligations.
The penalties were not merely punitive; they were declaratory of intention. In other words, Europe was asserting that platform architecture itself can affect democratic and economic autonomy.
The confrontation extends beyond competition law into information governance. The social platform X, owned by Elon Musk, has been investigated and fined under European digital-content rules for failures related to transparency, advertising practices, and data access obligations. Such actions demonstrate that European regulators are no longer reluctant referees, they are becoming geopolitical actors in the digital sphere.
In spite of all these, EU is aware that regulation alone does not create sovereignty. The more profound shift lies in infrastructure creation and development across their geographical areas of interest.
Several European governments are now replacing American software in public administration with domestic or open-source alternatives to reduce strategic dependency. France has announced plans to migrate millions of civil servants away from foreign collaboration platforms toward nationally controlled systems, while Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Italy are adopting open-source tools such as LibreOffice and Nextcloud within public institutions.
The rationale is not ideological hostility toward U.S. firms; it is risk management per excellence. Many Governments fear that geopolitical disputes could translate into technological vulnerability, service denial, data exposure, or political leverage, with what happens when an IMF official was cut off by Microsoft last year or so.
This concern intensified after geopolitical crises demonstrated how digital infrastructure can become a pressure point in international conflicts. Control over communication networks, satellite connectivity, and cloud access proved capable of shaping military and diplomatic outcomes. States therefore began to treat software dependency as equivalent to energy dependency.
Consequently, now Europe is funding its own technological ecosystem. Large-scale initiatives such as EuroStack aim to build an independent digital infrastructure capable of reducing reliance on foreign platforms.
Germany is developing sovereign open-source foundation AI models, while Portugal is constructing national language AI systems for public administration.
France’s AI startup Mistral has grown rapidly as governments and corporations seek alternatives to American models, reflecting demand for regional technological control.
Meanwhile, public investment into sovereign cloud infrastructure across Europe is projected to triple within two years, with governments migrating sensitive workloads into locally governed systems.
What emerges is not technological isolation but technological multipolarity. At this moment however, the United States continues to lead in commercial innovation and platform scale. China pursues state-integrated digital ecosystems. Europe prioritizes regulatory legitimacy and autonomy. India builds population-scale public digital infrastructure. Africa experiments with mobile-native financial and identity systems.
Each region is defining sovereignty differently, but all agree on one point: dependence on external digital infrastructure is a strategic liability.
From my perspective, this transformation fundamentally alters geopolitics. As we all know, the Cold War revolved around nuclear deterrence. Whilst the post-Cold War era revolved around economic globalization, the present era revolves around computational control.
The competition for influence is no longer primarily about whose army crosses borders. It is about whose operating system runs inside them.
In this environment, alliances may persist, but trust will increasingly depend on technological independence. Nations are not decoupling from technology, they are localizing it. And in doing so, they are redefining power itself: sovereignty is no longer secured only by defending territory, but by owning the code that governs society. That is the reality nations are confronting in this Algorithm Age.
Conclusion: The Coming Negotiation of Civilization Models
The world is not moving toward one dominant system, rather, it is entering an era where different governance philosophies coexist and compete simultaneously.
The 20th century asked: which ideology wins? The 21st century asks: which system adapts? Most of the Western societies are reconsidering corporate influence and industrial policy. Europe seeks autonomy without isolation. Russia defends centralized sovereignty. China integrates economy into state purpose. India balances democracy with strategy. Canada is cutting its unbibilical cord ftom US. Africa leverages multiplicity of partners and struggling to build own infrastructures.
It now obvious even to the blind thst Global politics is no longer a linear progression toward a single model. It is a marketplace of governance structures. This is in my view snd perhaps the most important realization for leaders today: The future will not belong to the most powerful nation alone, but to the societies that best align authority, legitimacy, and economic purpose.
Power is being renegotiated, not only between countries, but between ideas of how nations should be governed.
The geopolitical contest of our century is therefore not merely about dominance. It is about defining the relationship between wealth, state, and citizen in a world where influence travels faster than borders.
I therefore like to submit that the age of one system is over. The age of competing civilizational frameworks has begun.
Prof. Sarumi, a digital transformation architect,
geopolitical strategist and leadership scholar on global power systems, write from Lagos.